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for Schumpeterian profits. We then estimate the value of these profits for the non-farm
business economy. We conclude that only a miniscule fraction of the social returns from
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most of the benefits of technological change are passed on to consumers rather than captured
by producers.
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  The United States economy has benefited from rapid technological 
change over the last decade. The present study inquires into the fraction 
of the benefits from new technologies that have been captured by 
innovators (these being Schumpeterian profits) as compared to the 
fraction that have been passed on in lower prices.  
 
  The question of the appropriability of technological change is 
important for several reasons. First, we want to understand the role of 
innovational profits in total profits. Second, investors want to understand 
the importance of innovation in stock-market returns. Third, to the extent 
that innovation leads to higher wealth, there is a wealth effect of 
technological change on aggregate demand (this being the “Greenspan 
effect” posited by Fed chairman Alan Greenspan). This study examines 
each of these phenomena. 
 
I. A Model of Appropriability and Schumpeterian Profits 
 A.  Background 
 
  Endogenous growth theory, along with the theory of induced 
innovation, has developed important new approaches to understanding 
the role of innovation in economic growth. Joseph Schumpeter 
introduced modern approaches in his pathbreaking book, The Theory of 
Economic Development.1 The formal theory of induced innovation arose in 
the 1960s in an attempt to understand why technological change appears 
 
1 Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, variously dated as 1911 or 1912, 
available currently in translation published by Transaction Books, New 
Brunswick, N.J., 1983. 
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to have been largely labor saving.2 More recently, theories of induced 
technological change were revived as the new growth theory, pioneered 
by Robert Lucas and Paul Romer.3 This has blossomed into a major 
research field, with a wide variety of theories and applications.4  
         
  Virtually all studies of induced innovation have been theoretical. 
With few exceptions, they do not lay out a set of testable hypotheses or 
ones that can be used to model the innovation process at an industrial 
level. There are to my knowledge no estimates of total Schumpeterian 
profits by industry or for the entire economy.  
 
  The underlying idea to be developed in this section is 
straightforward. Numerous individuals and firms in a modern economy 
are engaged in innovative activities designed to produce new and 
improved goods and services along with processes that reduce the cost of 
production. Some of these are formalized in legal ownership of 
intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks, 
while others are no more than trade secrets or early-mover advantages. 
 
2 See Richard Nelson, “The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research,” 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 67, 1959, pp. 297-306, and Kenneth Arrow, 
“Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in 
Richard Nelson, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton 
University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1962, pp. 609-
625. 
 
3 See Robert E. Lucas, “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” 
Journal of Monetary Economics, January 1988, pp. 3-32, and Paul Romer, 
“Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, 
October 1990, No. 5, Part 2, pp. S71-S102. 
 
4 A comprehensive survey is provided in Philippe Aghion and Peter 
Howitt, Endogenous Growth Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1997. 
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Some of the innovative activities produce extra-normal profits (called 
Schumpeterian profits), which are profits above those that would 
represent the normal return to investment and risk-taking. 
 
  In this study, we take a slightly restrictive definition of 
Schumpeterian profits. These comprise only the profits that exceed the 
risk-adjusted return to innovative investments. In other words, any 
research and development (R&D) that yields a normal return on 
investment will lead to an increase in output or decrease in inputs but no 
increase in appropriately measured5 multifactor productivity (MFP). 
 
  Most of the innovations produce social value as well as private 
value. When copy machines replace scribes, or computers replace hand 
calculations, the social cost of producing a given amount of goods and 
services declines. It is well established that innovators do not generally 
capture the entire social value of inventive and innovational activity.6  
 
5 Because of U.S. accounting conventions, R&D is treated as a current rather 
than a capital expense and will distort measures of MFP growth. 
Additionally, some R&D is devoted to new products, which may not be 
captured in price indexes; this factor will probably underestimate MFP 
growth. 
6 There is a vast literature discussing the relationship between social and 
private returns to innovation. See Zvi Griliches, “Research Expenditures 
and Growth Accounting,” in M. Brown, ed., Science and Technology in 
Economic Growth, New York, Wiley, 1973; Zvi Griliches, “Productivity, 
R&D, and Basic Research at the Firm Level in the 1970s,” American Economic 
Review, vol. 76, 1986, pp. 141-54; Bronwyn Hall, “The Private and Social 
Returns to Research and Development,” in Bruce Smith and Claude 
Barfield, Technology, R&D, and the Economy, Brookings, 1995, pp. 140-183; 
Adam Jaffe, “Technological Opportunity and Spillover of R&D: Evidence 
from Firms’ Patents, Profits, and Market Value,” American Economic Review, 
vol. 76, 1986, pp. 984-1001; Adam Jaffe, Manuel Trajenberg, and Rebecca 
Henderson, “Geographical Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as 
evidence by Patent Citations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993; Richard   5
                                                                                                                             
 
  To a first approximation, it is generally believed, most of the value 
of new products and processes are eventually passed on to consumers in 
the form of lower prices of goods and services. But not all, and not 
immediately. Often, inventors and innovators get at least a slice of the 
social returns to productivity growth. Although there is scattered 
evidence that the degree of appropriability varies greatly across 
industries, there is little evidence on the size of the slice that goes to the 
originators of technological change and no evidence on the size of 
Schumpeterian profits for the entire economy. Some industries like 
pharmaceuticals have high rates of profit and appear to capture a 
substantial fraction of the value of new products during (and sometimes 
after!) the patent lifetimes. Other industries, such as farming, are ones, 
which have enjoyed very rapid productivity growth without a 
corresponding high profitability of farmers or farm-equipment 
manufacturers. 
 
Levin, Alvin Klevorick, Richard Nelson, and Sidney Winter, 
“Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 3, 1987, pp. 783- 820; Edwin 
Mansfield, “Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial 
Innovations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1977, vol. 91, pp. 221-40, “Basic 
Research and Productivity Increase in Manufacturing,” American Economic 
Review, vol. 70, 1980, pp. 863-873, “How Fast Does New Industrial 
Technology Leak Out?” Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 34, 1985, pp. 217-
223, “Macroeconomic Policy and Technological Change,” in Jeffrey C. 
Fuhrer and Jane Sneddon Little, eds, Technology and Growth, Conference 
Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1996, pp. 183-200; Edwin 
Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovations, 
1995, NTIS, Washington, D. C.; and Nathan Associates, Net Rates of Return 
on Innovation, Report to the National Science Foundation, 1978.   6
  B. A Two-Period Model 
 
  We can formalize these issues as follows. The model that follows is 
just a sketch of how innovational profits arise. There is no attempt to 
derive this from first microeconomic principles as that would probably 
either impose unrealistic limitations on the assumptions or produce 
untestable implications.  
 
  The basic assumption is that there is a stream of innovations in an 
industry, which lead to a more or less continuous reduction in the cost of 
production, ct , for firm or industry i (I suppress the notation that this 
refers to industry i where inessential). Some of the innovations are in the 
public domain, such as the availability of improved weather forecasts. 
These are inappropriable and are therefore passed on in lower costs and 
prices of goods or services. Other cost reductions are at least partially 
appropriable by the producers in the industry and are only partially 
passed on in price reductions. For those innovations whose cost 
reductions are partially appropriated, the producers or innovators will 
have temporary increases in profits, which are labeled Schumpeterian 
profits. 
 
  The two-period version of this model will illustrate the basic points. 
Consider a perfectly competitive industry where the technology is 
constant returns to scale. The level of productivity is represented by At , 
and the cost of production is Ct = kAt , where k is a constant. In period 0, 
the dominant technology is widely available and determines the market 
price.  The dominant technology has cost C0 and the good has a market 
price of P0 = C0 .     7
 
  A new innovation arrives in period 1 and lowers production cost to 
C1 <  C0 . Assume that the inventor can appropriate the fraction α of the 
cost savings from the innovation; α is the fundamental appropriability 
ratio, which will be estimated below. Then for small innovations, the 
inventor maximizes profit by setting the price at P1  = C1 + α (C0 –C1). 
Figure 1 shows the initial competitive price, new cost, and new price 
under these assumptions. The shaded profit region is Schumpeterian 
profits. As is shown in Figure 1, the second-period price (P1) lies between 
competitive cost of the old technology (C0) and the new lower cost of the 
innovation (C1). The extent to which P1 is above the C1 depends upon the 




Figure 1. Technological Change and Schumpeterian Profits 
The shaded region shows the Schumpeterian profits, while social surplus 
is the quadrilateral bounded by the P0 = C0  line, the demand curve, the 
C1 line and the vertical axis. The ratio of Schumpeterian profits to social 
gains is determined by the appropriability ratio. 
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 The  inventor=s profits are equal to (P1 - C1)X1, which can be 
approximated by  α (C0 - C1)X0 = α [(C0 - C1)/C0](P0 X0)  =  α (∆A 1 /A 0 )Q0 , 
where Qt = Pt Xt  is nominal output. In words, the private value of the 
innovation to the innovator is approximately equal to the appropriability ratio 
times the rate of improvement in technology times the nominal value of output. 
 
  To put this theory in a dynamic framework, we need to take into 
account the erosion of Schumpeterian profits over time. These temporary 
profits decay because of such factors as the expiration or non-
enforcement of patents, the ability of others to imitate or innovate around 
innovations, the introduction of superior goods and services, and the loss 
of first-mover advantages. I will model the erosion of Schumpeterian 
profits as a simple exponential-decay process with decay rate λ per year. 
This implies that if an innovation was introduced θ years ago, the 
appropriation rate would be αe-λθ at the end of θ years. Finally, to 
simplify the analysis, I assume for this exposition that prices and costs 
are normalized so that the cost of inputs is always 1. This implies that 
any reduction in costs is due only to productivity growth. 
 
 C.  A  Multi-Period  Model 
 
  Using the framework just introduced, this implies that if there were 
only one innovation, which occurs in period (t-θ), current price would be: 
 
(1) Pt  = Ct - αe-λθ (Ct - Ct-θ ).   
 
Here, α is the first-period appropriability of innovations, while the 
appropriability θ periods after the innovation is αe-λθ. If the stream of innovations is continuous, then current price would be determined by 
the past innovations and the extent to which Schumpeterian profits had 
eroded. Because an innovation θ periods ago yielded a cost improvement 
of  , we can integrate all the cost improvements over time to obtain 





(2)  Pt  = Ct  -  ∫
0
∞




The integral on the right hand side of (2) is the accumulated 
Schumpeterian profits, which I define as St :
 
(3)  St  =  ∫
0
∞




Note that since costs are falling over time, St  is positive. 
 
  Finally, note that if the rate of productivity growth is constant at h* 
per year, then (2) and (3) simplify to: 
 
(4)  (Pt - Ct)/Ct  = ∫
0
∞




 We  define  µt as the Schumpeterian profit margin. The equilibrium 
Schumpeterian profit margin is equal to the appropriability ratio times a 
dynamic factor that equals the ratio of the rate of productivity growth 
divided by the difference between the rate of decay of Schumpeterian 
profits and the rate of productivity growth. The upper limit on the rate of 
  10profit is the appropriability factor, but this upper limit gets diluted by the 
evaporation of Schumpeterian profits. 
 
  Define the profit margin as µt = (Pt  - Ct)/Ct . Then take the time 
derivative of the markup and use equations (2) and (3), which yields 
 
  Ct  +  µt  = d[∫
0
∞






t C t C
•
 








In steady state, where µt and ht are constant at µ* and h*, this reduces to 
 
(6)  µ* =  α h*/( λ – h*) 
 
which is identical to equation (4). 
 
  We can also derive equation (5) in difference form, which yields 
 
(7) µt = (1 - λ)µt -1 + α ht + µt-1 ht 
 
The major coefficients of interest are λ, which is the rate of depreciation 
of Schumpeterian profits, and α, which is the Schumpeterian 
appropriation ratio. 
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  Equations (6) and (7) are two alternative representations of the 
relationship between the Schumpeterian profit margin and the rate of 
technological progress. Equation (6) would be appropriate in 
circumstances where the industry was in “innovational steady state” – 
that is, where the rate of innovation was more or less constant. Equation 
(7) would be appropriate where the rate of technological change were 
changing, such as occurred in the new economy over the last decade.  
 
  D. A Multi-Period Calibrated Model 
 
  We can illustrate the model here using a calibrated model of 
innovation. For this purpose, I assume follow the model described in the 
last section. Invention is assumed to be uncertain and follow a beta 
distribution with parameters (3, .3): 
 
  ht  is distributed as .02 β(3, .3)  
 
This produces a median annual productivity growth of 0.3 percent per 
year and a standard deviation of around 10 percent per year. Multifactor 
productivity of the low-cost producer is equal to ht . The other 
parameters are: 
 
  α = appropriability factor = 0.2 
  λ = depreciation rate = 0.08 per year 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show a typical simulation of the system. Figure 2 shows 
the monopoly cost as the solid line as well as the market price with + 
marks. The market price is always higher than the monopoly price   13
because of partial appropriability. Additionally, when there is little 
innovation (as between period 27 and 37), the price-cost margin tends to 
shrink as the Schumpeterian margin depreciates. 
 
  Figure 3 shows the Schumpeterian margin, defined as the ratio γ = 
(market price – monopoly cost)/market price. This margin shoots up 
after a major invention, and then declines as Schumpeterian profits 
dissipate. From equation (6), the theoretical average Schumpeterian 
margin is  
  
  µ* = αh*/( λ –h*) = 0.2 .018/(.08-.018 ) = 5.8 percent, 
 
whereas the average from the simulation shown in Figure 3 is 4.3 
percent. The difference is due to the non-linearity of the margin equation. 
 
  Figure 4 compares the price trajectories of two simulations with the 
same underlying technological shocks but with different appropriability 
ratios, while Figure 5 shows the associated profit margins. For the high 
appropriability ratio of 0.5, the Schumpeterian margin is higher as actual 
price tends to remain above the monopoly cost while with the lower 
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Figure 3. Simulation Schumpeterian profit margin (n = 1000) 
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Figure 4. Price trajectories under low and high appropriability (n = 50)  
(Upper line (o) has appropriability factor of 0.5 while lower line (x) has 
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Figure 5. Schumpeterian margins with high and low appropriability (n = 
1000) 
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 II. A Macroeconomic Estimate of Schumpeterian Profits 
 
  This section provides estimates of the importance of Schumpeterian 
profits for the nonfarm business sector (the farm sector is excluded 
because land values are such a large fraction of total capital in that 
sector). The basic calculation is the impact of multifactor productivity 
(MFP) growth on capital income. In addition, I will show that the results 
are insensitive to whether the variable is multifactor productivity or 
labor productivity. The data are prepared by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) for their calculations of multifactor productivity. The 
analysis here primarily uses a margin defined as total property income 
divided by total costs (m1). This margin is available from the BLS data 
and has relatively few conceptual difficulties.7   
 
  We should note that the theory applies to all innovations, domestic 
and foreign. In practice, the technique used here can only estimate 
appropriability for individual firms or countries. In this study, for 
example, we estimate the impact of multifactor productivity growth in 
the United States on innovational profits in the United States. Since there 
are both spill-outs to the international economy from domestic 
innovation as well as spill-ins to the U.S. economy from foreign 
innovations, our estimates are likely to be distorted. The direction of the 
distortion is difficult to determine, however, because the procedure is 
likely to overestimate the appropriability of domestic innovations 
(because some productivity impacts occur abroad) and underestimate 
 
7 All data are available at http://www.bls.gov/web/prod3.supp.toc.htm.    19
domestic appropriability because of foreign innovations (which affect 
productivity but will not affect domestic profits). 
 
  For this purpose, we estimate eight different specifications. These 
are annual data and decadal data; a linear equilibrium relationship and a 
non-linear equilibrium relationship; and in level and first difference. The 
linear equation takes the following form: 
 
(8)  µ(t)  = γ0 +  γ1 h(t) + ε(t) 
where µ(t) is the Schumpeterian profit margin, h(t) is the rate of growth 
of multifactor productivity, ε(t) is a random disturbance, and γ0 and γ1 
are estimated coefficients.  
 
  In equation (8), to determine the appropriability parameter, we take 
the derivative of µ with respect to h, which yields: 
 
  dµ/dh =  αh*/( λ – h*)
2 
 
from which we derive  
 
  α = [dµ/dh] ( λ – h*)
2/ h* 
 
where [dµ/dh] is the regression coefficient, λ is set a priori at 0.2, and h* is 
the mean of the sample for h. 
 
(9)  dµ/dh =  αh*/( λ – h*)
2 
   20
                                             
  The non-linear specification takes the following form, which 
estimates the appropriability coefficient directly conditional on the 
depreciation rate: 
 
(10)  µ(t)  = γ0 +  α { h*/( λ – h*)} + ε(t) 
 
  The results of these estimates for the non-farm business sector are 
shown in Table 1. The overall estimates are quite consistent for the 
different specifications and show an appropriability factor of between 5 
percent and 10 percent for the non-farm business sector. Standard errors 
are consistently estimated only for the third and fourth rows, but these 
show quite well determined coefficients, with standard errors in the 
order of 1.5 percentage points. 
 
  Figure 6 shows a plot of the left- and right-hand sides of equation 
(9). The dots are the data for1949-2001, while the line shows the 
equilibrium relationship between productivity and the gross margin that 
would be consistent with an appropriability factor of 5 percent.  
 
  There is no consensus on the appropriate depreciation rate for 
R&D, with estimates ranging from 10 to 25 percent per year. The 
calculations in Table 1 assume a depreciation rate of 20 percent per year, 
which is consistent with data from patent renewals.8 It has not been 
 
8 See Ariel Pakes and Margaret Simpson, “Patent Renewal Data,” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics, 1989, pp. 331-410 and the 
references therein. Estimates of the depreciation rate for patent renewals 
are higher than the numbers in the literature on the returns to research and 
development (which cluster around 15 percent per year). However, the 
latter generally refer to social rather than private depreciation, and the 
private rate would generally exceed the social rate due to erosion of market   21
                                                                                                                             
possible with the macroeconomic data to estimate the appropriability 
ratio and the deprecation rate jointly. However, the first set of four 
columns in Table 2 shows estimated values of the appropriability ratio 
conditional on different depreciation rates. The appropriability ratios are 
clearly sensitive to the depreciation assumption. The Schumpeterian 
profit margins are much less sensitive, however, as is shown in the last 
set of four columns in Table 2. The average value of the Schumpeterian 
margin across the eight specifications varies from a high of 0.55 percent 
for the lowest depreciation rate to a high of 0.58 for the highest 
depreciation rate. 
 
  The appropriability applies only to the first year of an innovation. 
After the first year, the appropriability depreciates over time because of 
imitation and loss of market power. Figure 7 shows the time path of 
appropriability for the first estimate in Table 1 and for two alternative 
depreciation rates. Lower depreciation rates lead to lower initial 
appropriability ratios than those calculated with higher depreciation 
rates, but this ranking is reversed through depreciation after a few years. 
 
  Additionally, we attempted to estimate the dynamic specification 
in equation (7) above. The results were uniformly unsatisfactory, with 
negative depreciation factors and wildly differing appropriability factors. 
The difficulty is apparently the cyclical nature of productivity and 
profitability, which yields a spurious relationship between the two series 
that is not related to underlying trend multifactor productivity. Given 
 
position of the innovator. (See Bronwyn H. Hall, “Industrial Research 
during the 1980s: Did the Rate of Return Fall?” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, Microeconomics, 1993, pp. 289-343.)   22
the difficulties in capturing the dynamic specification, it is dropped for 
the balance of this study. 
 
  It is useful to determine how sensitive the estimates are to the 
measure of productivity that is used. The second column of Table 3 
shows estimates of the appropriability ratio where we substitute BLS’s 
measure of labor productivity for multifactor productivity. A comparison 
of these estimates with those from Table 1, shown for convenience in the 
first column of Table 3, indicate essentially the same estimates. Also (not 
shown), the standard errors of the coefficients are very similar to those in 
Table 1. 
 
  Figure 8 shows the importance of estimated Schumpeterian profits 
in total corporate profits over the 1948-2001 period. The estimated share 
varied from a low of -1.3 percent to a high of 6.3 percent of corporate 
profits (the negative number arises because of negative measured MFP 
growth for several years in the 1974-82 period). 
 
  Finally, we can estimate the overall appropriability of innovation 
using both the appropriability coefficient and the depreciation rate. The 
central estimates of these two parameters are 0.07 and 0.20. If we 
combine these estimates with a growth rate of the economy of 3 percent 
per year and a discount rate on Schumpeterian profits of 10 percent per 
year, this implies that 2.2 percent of the total present value of social 
returns to innovation are captured by innovators. The highest and lowest 
present value of that ratio from all the estimates in Tables 1 and 2 are 1.3 
percent and 3.3 percent. 
  
      Regression     Appropriability    Equilibrium Share
















Level +AR 0.391 0.090 7.8% 1.8% [b] 0.55%
Difference 0.376 0.083 7.5% 1.7% [b] 0.53%
Non-linear equilibrium
Level +AR 0.062 0.015 6.2% 1.5% 0.44%
Difference 0.059 0.014 5.9% 1.4% 0.42%
Equilibrium: Decadal [d]
Linear equilibrium
Level +AR 0.521 0.134 10.4% 2.7% [b] 0.74%
Difference 0.522 0.129 10.4% 2.6% [b] 0.74%
Non-linear equilibrium
Level +AR 0.092 0.023 9.2% 2.3% [c] 0.65%
Difference 0.091 0.022 9.1% 2.2% [c] 0.64%
[a] All estimates assume the depreciation rate is 20 percent per year (exponential).
[b] These standard errors take the standard errors and scale them proportionally for the ratio
  of the appropriability coefficient to the regression coefficient.
[c] These standard errors are inconsistent because the samples overlap.
[d] The decadal estimates take 10-year averages of margins and total factor productivity growth.
Notes on regression equations:
The linear equilibrium estimates are equations of the following form:
µ(t)  = γ0 +  γ1 h(t) + ε(t)
where
α =  γ1 ( λ – h*)2/ h*
The (lambda = 0.2) equilibrium estimates are
µ(t)  = γ0 +  α {h(t)/[ λ – h(t)]} +  ε(t)  
 










-.2 -.1 .0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
h2/(.2-h2) = growth tfp/(lambda - growth tfp)
Margin (m1)













Figure 6. Relationship between productivity growth and the gross margin 
for private business sector. 
 Horizontal axis is the right hand side of equation (6) for the business sector 
over the period 1949-2002 while the vertical axis is the Schumpeterian 
margin. The slope is estimated to be 0.059, which is the estimated 
appropriability ratio. Using these estimates, the share of Schumpeterian 
profits is estimated to be 0.037 percent of total output. 
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    Appropriability                Equilibrium Share
              Ratio                   of Schumpeterian
                          Profits 
λ = λ = λ = λ = λ = λ = λ = λ =
Sector and method 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Equilibrium: Annual
Linear equilibrium
Level +AR 3.9% 7.8% 11.7% 15.7% 0.60% 0.55% 0.54% 0.53%
Difference 3.8% 7.5% 11.3% 15.0% 0.57% 0.53% 0.52% 0.51%
Non-linear equilibrium
Level +AR 1.6% 6.2% 10.3% 14.3% 0.24% 0.44% 0.47% 0.49%
Difference 1.5% 5.9% 9.9% 13.7% 0.22% 0.42% 0.45% 0.47%
Equilibrium: Decadal
Linear equilibrium
Level +AR 5.2% 10.4% 15.6% 20.8% 0.79% 0.74% 0.72% 0.71%
Difference 5.2% 10.4% 15.7% 20.9% 0.79% 0.74% 0.72% 0.71%
Non-linear equilibrium
Level +AR 3.9% 9.2% 14.4% 19.6% 0.60% 0.65% 0.66% 0.67%
Difference 3.9% 9.1% 14.2% 19.4% 0.59% 0.64% 0.65% 0.66%
 
Table 2. Appropriability ratios and Schumpeterian profit margins for 








































Figure 7. Appropriability for Different Depreciation Rates 
This figure shows the appropriability factor for an innovation as a function 
of the appropriability ratio and the time since the innovation. The two 
curves are for the two different depreciation rates as shown in Table 2.  
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       Appropriability
                 Ratio 





Level +AR 0.078 0.073
Difference 0.075 0.070
Non-linear equilibrium




Level +AR 0.104 0.121
Difference 0.104 0.121
Non-linear equilibrium
Level +AR 0.092 0.094
Difference 0.091 0.091
Note: Table shows the estimated appropriability ratio for three different specifications:
  column (1) is the main specification shown in Table 1
  Column (2) is identical to column (1) except that the productivity concept is
output per hour worked.  






























































Figure 8. Schumpeterian profits as percent of total corporate profits 
This figure shows total Schumpeterian profits in the non-farm business sector as 
percent of total corporate profits. These are calculated by applying the estimated 
parameters to BLS’s estimate of multifactor productivity growth. Estimated 
Schumpeterian profits were 3.8 percent of total profits over the 1948 – 2001 period.
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V. Implications for Profits and Wealth 
  
  In this section, we consider the implications of this analysis for the 
stock market and for the “Greenspan effect.” 
 
  A. Schumpeterian profits and the stock market   
 
  In the late 1990s, the stock market rose sharply, particularly in the 
“new economy” sectors of computers, software, and communications. 
There were many reasons put forth for the dramatic rise, but many 
analysts pointed to the impact of rapid technological change on profits 
and stock values. To put this in the language of this study, if the rapid 
growth in innovation has led to an accompanying rapid growth in 
Schumpeterian profits, then the present value of future profits would rise 
sharply.  
 
  To put this quantitatively, consider the following example: The 
new economy amounts to 5 percent of nominal output. Up to an initial 
period (1995?), productivity is perceived to be growing at the same rate 
as in other sectors. Then, a rapid acceleration of productivity growth 
occurs. In the new world, costless multifactor productivity growth is 15 
percent per year. Assuming total output is $10 trillion in the initial year, 
the new economy would be adding about $75 billion per year per year in 
social surplus in the initial year. If the new entrepreneurs could capture 
90 percent of the new economy surplus in Schumpeterian profits with 
low depreciation, then with other plausible parameters, the increase in   30
                                             
value of new economy firms would be $5.8 trillion.9 This is close to the 
increase in value of new economy firms from 1995 to 2000. 
 
  The problem with this scenario, however, is that the likelihood of 
new economy entrepreneurs capturing half of the social surplus is 
vanishingly small. One reason for doubting a high appropriability is, as 
shown by the results in this study, that U.S. capitalism grinds 
Schumpeterian profits into such a fine powder that they can barely be 
detected in the macroeconomic. If the new economy entrepreneurs could 
capture 7 percent of the social gains – which is a good guess based on our 
estimates – then under the assumptions above the increase in the market 
value of the excess profits from the productivity acceleration would be 
$410 billion rather than to $5.8 trillion. (This $410 billion would, of 
course, be in excess to the normal return to capital and intangible 
investments.) 
 
  A second reason to be skeptical of high Schumpeterian profits in 
the new economy is because of the nature of the industry. With a few 
exceptions, entry and exit is relatively easy; the rapidity of the entry and 
easy demise of new economy firms indicates not only that bright ideas 
could get easily funded but also, alas, that imitators are quick to follow. 
 
9 The assumptions behind this are the following: I assume that the new 
economy is 5 percent of a $10 trillion economy; that the new economy is 
growing at 6 percent per year in real terms (in nominal values deflated by 
the GDP price index) for the first 20 years, then at 3 percent after that; that 
entrepreneurs appropriate half of the social value of technological change; 
that the rate of costless technological change is 15 percent per year; and that 
the real discount rate on earnings is10 percent per year. Under these 
assumptions, the present value of new economy earnings is $7.2 trillion 
when discounting the profits for the first 50 years, which is $5.8 trillion 
more than the value would be if the new economy had the same parameters 
as the old economy.   31
                                             
One way that the high entry and exit will affect Schumpeterian profits is 
through the depreciation rate, which is likely to be very high in new-
economy sectors. Etoys.com sounded like a great idea for toys; but Toys-
R-Us had more savvy and toys and could easily and quickly adopt the 
bright ideas of the first movers. In reality, both are bankrupt today. 
While we have incomplete information on the aggregate profits of new-
economy firms, it appears that at the peak of the cycle in 2000, profits in 
this industry were actually negative.10  
 
  A third reason to doubt the presence of large Schumpeterian profits 
is that the information revolution concerns information, which is 
generally hard to appropriate. The economic nature of information is that 
it is expensive to produce and inexpensive to reproduce. Indeed, with the 
Internet, it is often essentially free to reproduce and distribute vast 
amounts of information. The low costs of imitation, transmission, and 
distribution of information technologies are likely to erode the value of 
property rights in intellectual property and reduce the durability of 
Schumpeterian profits in the new economy. An illustrative case is the 
appropriability of the value of knowledge embedded in encyclopedias. 
To imitate the Encyclopedia Britannica two decades ago would have 
required a massive investment in recruiting of scholars and editors along 
with a major publishing effort. Today, an online or CD encyclopedia is 
extremely inexpensive to produce and distribute, and some are free to 
 
10 The Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes corporate profits by industry 
for three new economy industries using the new industrial classification 
system (NAIQS) for the period 1998-2002: Computer and electronic 
products, Electrical equipment, appliances, and components, and 
Information. Profits for these industries was $-8 billion in 2000 and was 
negative for every year thereafter. (Data are from Table 6.16D in the NIPA 
tables at www.bea.gov.)   32
                                             
consumers, such as Microsoft’s online Encarta. Indeed, the Internet is 
itself a gigantic free encyclopedia. 
  
  B. The Greenspan Effect 
 
   In the late 1990s, productivity and the economy were growing 
rapidly, and some economists wondered whether there was a linkage 
through the stock market. Just such an effect was suggested by Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan: 
 
Productivity-driven supply growth has, by raising long-term profit 
expectations, engendered a huge gain in equity prices. Through the so-called 
“wealth effect,” these gains have tended to foster increases in aggregate 
demand beyond the increases in supply…. 
 
[In] recent years, largely as a result of the appreciating values of ownership 
claims on the capital stock, themselves a consequence, at least in part, of 
accelerating productivity, the net worth of households has expanded 
dramatically, relative to income. This has spurred private consumption to rise 
even faster than the incomes engendered by the productivity-driven rise in 
output growth.11
 
  I define the Greenspan effect as the impact of rising productivity on 
aggregate demand through the wealth effect on consumption. Chairman 
Greenspan suggests not only that the impact is positive, but also that it is 
larger than the impact on aggregate supply. 
 
11 Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Technology and the economy,” 
Before the Economic Club of New York, New York, New York, January 13, 
2000 at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/200001132.ht
m.   33
                                             
 
  The estimates provided here allow an estimate of the size of the 
Greenspan effect operating through private consumption. For this 
purpose, assume that all of output is produced in publicly owned 
corporations and that all productivity growth is driven by domestic 
innovation. From these, we deduce following from the model in section I. 
The current value of Schumpeterian profits as a fraction of corporate 
output is V =  αh*/(λ – h*), and the value of equities is the discounted 
value of that. Suppose that economy-wide productivity rises 
permanently by ∆h* percent per year. Further, assume that the marginal 
propensity to consume out of wealth is w. Using the empirical estimates 
from section II (α = .07 with λ = 0.2) and these assumptions, the ratio of 
the present value of Schumpeterian profits to corporate output is 4.8 
percent when productivity growth is 1 percent per year, while that ratio 
is 10.8 percent with productivity growth of 2 percent per year. Using the 
value of w of 0.04, the increase in consumption from an unanticipated 
increase in productivity growth by 1 percentage point is .04 x (.108 - .048) 
= 0.24 percent of total output.12
 
  Hence for the estimated value of the parameters, an unanticipated 1 
percent increase in multifactor productivity that is driven entirely by 
appropriable innovation will lead in the first year to a 1 percent increase 
 
12 The calculation becomes more complicated if we correct for the fact that 
the corporate output is only about 60 percent of total GDP and that only 
part of the return to capital is earned by public corporations. If all MFP 
growth in confined to public corporations, then the numbers in the text will 
all be scaled down by the ratio of the output of public corporations to GDP 
but the ratio, 0.24, will be unchanged. If some of MFP growth occurs 
outside of public corporations, then the ratio would be smaller to the extent 
that business owners are constrained from consuming according to the 
underlying consumption model.   34
in potential output and a 0.24 percentage point increase in consumption. 
This calculation suggests that the Greenspan effect on aggregate demand 
through consumption is about one-quarter of the effect on potential 
output, and that this impact of productivity growth through the 
Greenspan effect is not inflationary. 
 
 C.  Conclusion 
 
  The present study develops a technique for estimating the size of 
Schumpeterian profits in a market economy. It shows that innovational 
profits depend upon the appropriability of innovations as well as the rate 
of depreciation of profits from the innovations. Using data from the U.S. 
nonfarm business section, I estimate that innovators are able to capture 
about 2.2 percent of the total social surplus from innovation. This 
number results from a low rate of initial appropriability (estimated to be 
around 7 percent) along with a high rate of depreciation of 
Schumpeterian profits (judged to be around 20 percent per year). In 
terms of the rate of profit on capital, the rate of profit on the replacement 
cost of capital over the 1948-2001 period is estimated to be 0.19 percent 
per year. 
 
  One reaction to these numbers is that the rate of Schumpeterian 
profits is implausibly low given the enormous innovativeness of the 
American economy. Another reaction is that it clears up at least part of a 
puzzle about the profitability of American capitalism. Some observers 
have wondered why the rate of profit on corporate capital is so low. 
Indeed, over the last four decades in which we have careful 
measurement, the rate of profit after tax on nonfinancial corporations   35
averaged 5.9 percent per year, which was very close to the cost of capital 
over that period. How could the rate of profit be so low, it might be 
asked, given that the denominator omits several important assets (such 
as land and intangible investments) and the numerator includes 
important sources of profits (such as monopoly power and 
Schumpeterian profits)? At least part of this puzzle is resolved here by 
the finding that only 20 basis points of the rate of return to capital was 
due to Schumpeterian profits. 
  